Executive Compensation Incentives Impact on the Tone and Readability of Financial Reports by Mi, Xiaoyan
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Plan B and other Reports Graduate Studies 
8-2020 
Executive Compensation Incentives Impact on the Tone and 
Readability of Financial Reports 
Xiaoyan Mi 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports 
 Part of the Corporate Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mi, Xiaoyan, "Executive Compensation Incentives Impact on the Tone and Readability of Financial 
Reports" (2020). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 1455. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/1455 
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and 
other Reports by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
1Executive compensation incentives impact on the tone and readability of financial reports.
Abstract
Financial disclosures do not only influence the future reaction of customers, they also imply the
financial strategies of the managers of corporations. Through analysis, we find a strong causal
relationship between tone and readability of financial disclosures and incentive methods of
managers. Controlling executives’ pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and other variables,
executives with higher sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock volatility (vega) (Coles, Daniel,
Naveen, 2004) tend to announce reports with more negative tone and low readability.
21. Introduction
This study examines the relationships between incentive methods of corporate executives and
the tone and readability of their firms’ financial disclosures, specifically 10-K and 10-Q reports.
To study this relationship, we focus on delta and vega as different incentive drivers, where delta
represents wealth sensitivity to stock price and vega represents wealth sensitivity to stock
volatility (Core and Guay 2002, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006). Controlling for firm
characteristics, we find that executives with higher delta tend to issue financial disclosures with
more positive tone, less lengthy reports and more tables and exhibits. Executives with higher
vega tend to announce financial disclosures with more negative tone, more lengthy reports, and
use less tables and exhibits.
Financial disclosures show the financial condition of a firm. They are valuable for investors,
creditors and other relevant parties to grasp the financial status, operating results and cash flows
of the firm. And then help them analyze the profitability, solvency, investment income, loans and
trade. In this paper, we focus on 10-K and 10-Q reports. Registered public companies in the
United States are required to submit their financial disclosures yearly (10-K) and quarterly (10-Q)
to SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). These reports include financial data,
management discussion and analysis, and financial statements prepared and audited under GAAP
(Generally Accepted Accounting Principles).
Sadique, In and Veeraraghavan (2008) points out that the tone of financial disclosures affects
the firm’s stock return and volatility: “positive tone positively impacts return and negative tone
negatively impacts it... By contrast, we find that tone inversely impacts volatility. Tone’s impact
on volatility indicates that the tone of firm issued earnings press releases or their news coverage
significantly impacts investor uncertainty about future firm performance around the event day.”
3Additionally, Bai, Dong and Hu (2019) find that the readability of financial disclosures has
synchronicity with the stock return with the firm.
But how would these effects be influenced the compensation incentives of a firm? Shin (2003)
calls the strategic interaction between CEOs and investor through the releasing of financial
disclosures “a disclosure game.” In this game, the equilibrium prices will be formalized. This
gives chances to CEOs to manage their portfolio by releasing a type of financial disclosures that
maximizes their benefit. To achieve this goal, they need to consider how their compensation
package is structured with cash, stocks, and options. This structure determines the executives’
interests, as represented by executives’ pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and sensitivity of
executives’ wealth to stock volatility (vega). Thus, executives may issue statements intended to
increase stock price or stock volatility depending on the executives’ delta and vega, respectively.
Our results demonstrate that executives with higher delta tend to issue financial reports with
more positive tone and with high readability. This is consistent with the notion that executives
who are incentivized to increase stock price will manage the tone and readability of reports in a
wealth maximizing manner. Managers with higher vega tend to issue financial reports with more
negative tone negative tone and low readability. According to Sadique, In and Veeraraghavan
(2008), this would increase stock volatility and, thus, maximize the wealth of high-vega
executives.
42. Literature and Hypotheses
2.1: Delta and Vega
Delta and vega are both proxies for wealth sensitivity. As mentioned above, delta is the
sensitivity of executive’s wealth to stock price, and vega is the sensitivity to stock volatility.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) define pay-performance sensitivity as “the dollar change in CEO’s
wealth associated with a dollar change in the wealth of shareholder”. Also, a higher delta means
a closer alignment of interests between the executive and shareholders in that higher stock price
increases the wealth of both parties. Vega, the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return
volatility, usually is defined as “the change in the manager’s firm specific wealth due to a 1
percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock price” (Baker and Martin, 2011).
Thus, an executive with a high compensation vega is incentivized to increase their wealth by
increase stock volatility. Coles et al. (2006) show this to be the case with regard to risk-taking by
mangers. They find CEOs with high vegas take on more risk by investing more in R&D,
decreasing firm diversification, investing less in physical assets, and use more leverage.
2.2: Firm Disclosures
There is much extant financial disclosure literature examines the relation between financial
disclosures and stock returns, volatility, and the compensation of managers. Largely, there are
two forms of disclosure when studying tone and readability, specifically conference calls and
written reports.
“Quarterly earnings conference calls have been established as an informative disclosure medium
that provides incremental value-relevant information reflected in stock prices and trading volume”
5(Borochin et al, 2018). Based on textual analysis of publicly available conference calls for U.S.
firms, Borochin et al (2018) find that the tone of conference calls—negative, positive or neutral,
will have significant influence on volatility. Measures of call tones are negatively related to
volatility, positive tone calms the market and negative tone leads to more uncertainty. Also, Li et
al (2014) show that how much the manager speaks in a conference call is positively related to her
compensation, i.e. the more the manager speaks, the more she gets paid. This is because the more
managers speak, the more knowledgeable the managers and management team are. In addition,
the firms that recognize the knowledge-pay relation have higher firm value, because the
managers are more knowledgeable and productivity.
For written reports, Henry (2008) suggests that tone of written reports positively related to stock
returns. This is consistent with Sadique et al (2008), who also find that tone inversely impacts
volatility. The readability of reports is also inversely related to volatility, the higher the
readability (easy to read), the lower volatility, the lower the readability (hard to read), the higher
volatility (Loughran and McDonald, 2009). Loughran and McDonald (2009) introduce a measure
of plain English, which contains at least 6 concepts, comparing to the traditional way FOG,
which only contains two components, this seems to be more accurate. By comparing results from
other papers, Loughran and McDonald find that “managers clearly changed their writing style to
more closely follow the plain English guidelines”. An easy-to-read financial report delivers
much useful information to investors; hence, it helps investors to understand the market better
and be confident, on the contrary, a hard-to-read report confuses investors and make them worry
about the future. In a later study, Loughran and McDonald (2014) show that the net file size of
the 10K/Q in the SEC EDGAR database is a better measure of readability than the FOG index.
6This study extends the previous literature by examining how executives’ compensation
incentives impact how they write their firm’s 10K and 10Q financial reports.
2.3: Hypotheses
Since extant literature provides evidence about the relationship between financial report tone
and readability and stock returns and volatility, we examine how incentives to maximize
executive wealth is related to the tone and readability of the tone and readability of the firm’s
financial reports. Given the results in the extant literature and the incentive to maximize wealth,
we propose the following hypotheses:
A. Executives with high delta issue 10K/Q reports with more positive language and easier to
read.
This hypothesis indicates that executives with compensation portfolios that are very sensitive
to stock price will take actions in the financial reporting process to increase stock price.
B. Executives with high vega issue 10K/Q reports with more negative language and less
readability.
We propose that executives with compensation portfolios that are very sensitive to stock
volatility would like to increase the volatility in order to maximize their wealth.
3. Data
We use firm-specific data from COMPUSTAT- Fundamentals Quarterly, gathered quarterly.
The data spans the period from 1987 to 2016. Delta and vega of each executive come from
7Lilitha Naveen's website1. We consolidate the executives’ delta and vega into firm-level
variables in two different ways: 1) a simple average, and 2) a weighted average which is
weighted by the total wealth of executives. We divide delta and vega by 1000 in order to change
the magnitudes to be more interpretable.
For 10K/Q word summary, we use the data from Bill McDonald's web page2. Many
researchers use Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary, more specifically, the Harvard-IV-4
TagNeg (H4N) to classify if the word is positive or negative. Based on the H4N and actual usage
frequency that are most likely associated with a target construct, Loughran and McDonald (2011)
develop a new list of words to help identify the tone of financial reports better. For robustness,
our analysis uses various measures for tone and readability. They are calculated as follows,
Tone-measure-A = (Number of positive words/Total number of words) – (Number of
Negative words/Total number of words)
Tone-measure-B = (Number of negative words - Number of positive words)/ (Number of
negative words + Number of positive words)
Readability-C = Ln (Netfilesize)
Readability-D = (Number of Tables + Number of Exhibits)/ Total number of words
We also have other firm-related independent variables as controls the model. There are defined
as follows:
ROA = Income before extraordinary items/beginning total assets
SIZE = Ln (market value of equity at the fiscal year end)
1 https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/
2 https://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/
8MB = Market-to-book ratio measured at the quarter end
EBITRAT = Operating income before interest, taxes, and depreciation/ beginning total assets
WCAPRAT = Working Capital / beginning total assets
RERAT = Retained earnings/ beginning total assets
DEBTRAT = Total outstanding debt/ beginning total assets
SALESRAT = Total revenue/ beginning total assets
LOSS = 1 if EARN is negative, 0 otherwise
CHANGE_EARN = Percent change in EARN
SALESGROWTH = Change in sales from sales 3 months prior / sales 3 months prior
SUE = (EPS – EPS 3 months ago)/ stock price at the quarter end
4. Results
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of all the variables in the data set including the number
of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. This table gives us a brief
descriptive of all the variables we have. The mean of tone measure is -0.009, and standard
deviation of it is 0.006. The mean of Tone Measure B is -0.395, and the standard deviation is
0.214. The mean of readability c is 11.727 and the standard deviation is 0.984. The mean of
readability d is 0.002 and the standard deviation is also 0.002. The mean weighted-average delta
and vega are two or three times bigger than the average delta and vega. Because weighted
9average delta and vega are calculated by the weight of total wealth, this indicates that executives
with larger overall wealth have higher deltas and vegas.
Table 2 shows the correlations among all the independent variables, we are not surprised to
see the average delta (vega) and weighted average delta (vega) are highly correlated. The partial
correlations between independent variables and dependent variables are small, however. This
table also shows the significance of the correlations, and most are statistically significant at least
at the 10% level.
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Table 3 shows the results from the following regression model:
 눨ᄓ粨  t  粨 ܣ ܦ ܣ    ܫ   ܮ  ܫ  th   ܮ  h  th  ܮ        t h  ܮ  
Consistent with the literature and the mean of the tone measures, the intercepts of the tone
regressions indicate the tone of 10K/Q reports tends to be negative.
In Tone Measure A, the coefficient of delta is 0.0000469 and is statistically significant at the
1% level. This result demonstrates a positive relation between delta and the tone of the financial
reports (i.e. managers with higher deltas issue more positive reports) and supports Hypothesis A.
The coefficient of vega in Tone Measure A is -0.00238 and also is statistically significant at the
1% level. This shows a negative relation between vega and financial report tone (i.e. managers
with higher vega issue reports with more negativity) and supports Hypothesis B. In economic
terms, one standard deviation increase in delta corresponds to an increase in Tone Measure A of
2.02% while a one standard deviation increase in vega corresponds to a decrease in Tone
Measure A of 3.07%. A standard deviation increases in EBIT ratio, return on assets, and LOSS
results in changes in Tone Measure A of 2.357%, -3.31%, and 24.577%, respectively. Thus, the
magnitude of the impact vega has on tone is similar to variables that should have a strong
influence on tone. Delta’s impact is still strong, but about half of that of vega.
In Tone Measure B, the coefficient of delta is 0.00107 and is statistically significant at the 1%
level. This result demonstrates a positive relation between delta and the tone of the financial
reports, for example, managers with higher deltas issue more positive reports, and supports
Hypothesis A. The coefficient of vega in Tone Measure B is -0.0872 and also is statistically
significant at the 1% level. This shows a negative relation between vega and financial report tone,
for example, managers with higher vega issue less positive, and more negative reports, and
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supports Hypothesis B. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in delta
corresponds to an increase in Tone Measure B of 1.05% while a one standard deviation increase
in vega corresponds to a decrease in Tone Measure B of 2.56%. A standard deviation increases
in EBIT ratio, return on assets, and LOSS results in changes in Tone Measure B of 1.96%, 1.14%,
and 20.42%, respectively. Thus, the magnitude of the impact delta has on tone is similar to
variables that should have a strong influence on tone. Vega’s impact is twice as strong as them.
Models 3 and 4 are the readability measures, in Readability C, the coefficient of delta is -
0.0113 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result demonstrates a negative relation
between delta and the length of the financial reports (i.e. managers with higher deltas issue
shorter, and thus, more readable reports). The coefficient of vega in Readability C is 0.159, and it
is statistically significant at the 5% level. This shows a positive relation between vega and
financial report length (i.e. managers with higher vega issue lengthier, harder-to-read reports). In
economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in delta corresponds to a decrease in
Readability C of 0.373% while a one standard deviation increase in vega corresponds to an
increase in Readability C of 0.157%. A standard deviation increases in EBIT ratio, return on
assets, and LOSS results in changes in Readability C of -0.6%, -0.035%, and -6.3%, respectively.
Thus, the magnitude of the impact delta has on readability is half strong to EBIT ratio does and
ten times stronger than return on assets dose. Vega’s impact is still strong, but about half of that
of delta.
In Readability D, the coefficient of delta is -0.00000139, and not statistically significant at
standard levels. The coefficient of vega in Readability D is -0.000471, and it is statistically
significant at the 1% level. This shows a negative relation between vega and financial report
readability (i.e. managers with higher vega issue harder-to read reports), which supports
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Hypothesis B. However, in economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in delta
corresponds to aa increase in Readability D of 0.269% while a one standard deviation increase in
vega corresponds to a decrease in Readability D of 2.73%. A standard deviation increases in
EBIT ratio, return on assets, and LOSS results in changes in Readability C of 0.162%, 2.86%,
and 1.68%, respectively. Thus, the magnitude of the impact vega has on readability is similar to
variables that should have a strong influence on readability. Delta’s impact is ten times less
strong than that of vega.
Table 4 shows the regression results from the model including weighted average delta and
vega. All the inferences from the results in Table 3 are the same in Table 4. Although, the
economic effects are different.
In Tone Measure A, the coefficient of delta is 0.0000086 and is statistically significant at the
1% level. This result shows a positive relation between delta and the tone of the financial reports
(i.e. managers with higher deltas issue more positive reports) and supports Hypothesis A. The
coefficient of vega in Tone Measure A is -0.000863 and also is statistically significant at the 1%
level. This shows a negative relation between vega and financial report tone (i.e. managers with
higher vega issue reports with more negativity) and supports Hypothesis B. In economic terms,
one standard deviation increase in delta corresponds to an increase in Tone Measure A of 1.01%
while a one standard deviation increase in vega corresponds to a decrease in Tone Measure A of
2.44%. A standard deviation increases in EBIT ratio, return on assets, and LOSS results in
changes in Tone Measure A of 2.35%, 3.36%, and -10.87%, respectively. Thus, the magnitude of
the impact delta has on tone is similar to variables that should have a strong influence on tone.
Vega’s impact is still strong, but about half of that of delta.
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In Tone Measure B, the coefficient of delta is 0.000146 and is statistically significant at the 1%
level. This result demonstrates a positive relation between delta and the tone of the financial
reports, for example, managers with higher deltas issue more positive reports, and supports
Hypothesis A. The coefficient of vega in Tone Measure B is -0.034 and also is statistically
significant at the 1% level. This shows a negative relation between vega and financial report tone,
for example, managers with higher vega issue less positive, and more negative reports, and
supports Hypothesis B. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in delta
corresponds to an increase in Tone Measure B of 0.39% while a one standard deviation increase
in vega corresponds to a decrease in Tone Measure B of 2.19%. A standard deviation increases
in EBIT ratio, return on assets, and LOSS results in changes in Tone Measure B of 1.96%, 1.17%,
and -6.17%, respectively. Thus, the magnitude of the impact vega has on tone is similar to
variables that should have a strong influence on tone. Delta’s impact is ten times less strong than
vega.
Models 3 and 4 are the readability measures, in Readability C, the coefficient of delta is -
0.00263 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result demonstrates a negative
relation between delta and the length of the financial reports. The coefficient of vega in
Readability C is 0.0892, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. This shows a positive
relation between vega and financial report length. In economic terms, a one standard deviation
increase in delta corresponds to a decrease in Readability C of 0.24% while a one standard
deviation increase in vega corresponds to a decrease in Readability C of 0.19%. A standard
deviation increases in EBIT ratio, return on assets, and LOSS results in changes in Readability C
of -0.6%, -0.04%, and -0.81%, respectively. Thus, the magnitude of the impact delta and vega
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have on readability is half strong to EBIT ratio does and ten times stronger than return on assets
dose.
In Readability D, the coefficient of delta is 0.000000819, but not statistically significant at
standard levels. The coefficient of vega in Readability D is -0.000144, and it is statistically
significant at the 1% level. This shows a negative relation between vega and financial report
readability (i.e. managers with higher vega issue harder-to read reports), which supports
Hypothesis B. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in delta corresponds to a
decrease in Readability D of 0.43% while a one standard deviation increase in vega corresponds
to a decrease in Readability D of 1.83%. A standard deviation increases in EBIT ratio, return on
assets, and LOSS results in changes in Readability C of 0.17%, 2.89%, and -5.46%, respectively.
Thus, the magnitude of the impact vega has on readability is closer to variables that should have





We examine how executive compensation incentives impact on financial report disclosures by
investigating the relation between executives’ pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and sensitivity
of executives’ wealth to stock volatility (vega) (Coles, Daniel, Naveen, 2004) and the tone and
readability of 10K/Q reports.
Through statistical analyses, we find support for our hypotheses that delta positively impacts
report tone and readability while vega has a negative impact on tone readability. We find that
executives with higher delta tend to announce financial disclosures with more positive words
relative to negative words and overall less lengthy reports. Executives with higher vega tend to
announce financial disclosures with more negative tone, more lengthy reports, and use less tables
and exhibits.
This study contributes to the literature by showing the connection between the compensation
scheme and incentives of managing tone and readability in financial disclosures. Similar to the
description by Shin (2003), this is an interesting game between CEOs and investors.
19
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